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Trade Policy and Election-Year Politics:
The Truth About Title I of the HelmsBurton Act
Leslie R. Goldberg*
INTRODUCTION

Fidel Castro holds "an 'Olympic record' in surviving assassination
plots."1 Not only has the Cuban dictator survived numerous attempts on his
life, he has also weathered the U.S. embargo and the collapse of the Communist bloc. Although Castro now faces yet another challenge to his regime, his "Olympic record" in surviving assassination plots will likely
remain firmly intact.
The newest challenge to Castro's regime is the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, generally referred to as
the Helms-Burton Act, which was enacted into law on March 12, 1996.2
Title III of the Act, which came into effect on August 1, 1996, 3 creates a
private right of action allowing U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959 to file suit in
U.S. federal court against any U.S. or foreign entity that "traffics ' 4 in such
"Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 1998. The
author
wishes to thank Monica Vaca for her insightful comments.
1Kevin Fedarko, Openfor Business, TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at 50.
2
The Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110
Stat. 785 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 6021-91 (1996)) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
3 Section 306(b)(1) of the Helms-Burton Act provides that the President may suspend the
August 1, 1996 effective date of Title III if "the President determines ... that the suspension
is necessary to the national interest of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 306(b)(1). However, on July 16,
1996, President Clinton decided not to postpone Title III's effective date of August 1, 1996.
Sanctions: Clinton Delays Lawsuits Under Title III of Helms-Burton, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1158 (July 17, 1996) [hereinafter Clinton Delays Lawsuits].
4A person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person:
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of
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property.5 The drafters of the Hels-Burton Act claim that Title III will
protect the property rights of U.S. citizens whose property was wrongfully
confiscated by the Cuban government.6 The drafters also contend that Title
III will discourage foreign business investment in Cuba and thereby expedite the collapse of Castro's regime.7
Unfortunately, the passage and enforcement of Title ll's private right
of action has enraged the United States' trading partners and closest allies,
which regard it as an improper effort to extend U.S. sanctions against Cuba
to other countries in a flagrantly extraterritorial manner.8 Inspired by a
feeling that the United States is trying to bully them into submission, the
European, Mexican, and Canadian governments have responded by adopting retaliatory counter-measures to the Act, and the European Union has
challenged the law before the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
In an attempt to diffuse tensions with key U.S. trading partners, President Clinton suspended the right to bring lawsuits under Title Ill for six
months on July 16, 1996.10 On January 3, 1997, July 16, 1997, and January
16, 1998, President Clinton ordered further six-month suspensions of Title
III's private right of action and indicated in all instances that he would con-

confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of,
manages, uses or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property; (ii)
engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property; or (iii) causes, directs, participates in or profits from trafficking... by another
person or otherwise engages in trafficking... through another person.
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 4(13)(A).
The term "traffics" does not include:
(i) the delivery of international telecommunications signals to Cuba; (ii) the trading or
holding of securities publicly traded or held, unless the trading is with or by ... a specially designated national; (iii) transactions and uses of property incident to lawful
travel to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are necessary
to the conduct of such travel; or (iv) transactions and uses of property by a person who
is both a citizen of Cuba and a resident of Cuba, and who is not an official of the Cuban Government or the ruling political party in Cuba.
Id. §5 4(13)(B).
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 302(a)(1)(A). Traffickers will incur liability under
Title III after a three-month grace period beginning on the provision's effective date. Id.
Thus, the practical effect of allowing Title III to come into effect on August 1, 1996, is that
liability will accrue for any act of trafficking that takes place on or after November 1, 1996.
Delays Lawsuits, supra note 3.
Clinton
6
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 3; Clinton Delays Lawsuits,supra note 3.
7
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 3; Clinton Delays Lawsuits,supra note 3.
8

See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.

9

1d.

3. Sections 306(c)(1)(B)-(C) of the Helms-Burton
Act authorize the President to suspend the right to file lawsuits under Title III for renewable
periods of up to six months once Title III has taken effect if the President determines "that
such suspension is necessary to the national interest of the United States and will expedite
the transition to democracy in Cuba." Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 306(c)(1)(B)-(C).
1o ClintonDelays Lawsuits, supra note
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tinue to suspend the provision every six months so long as the United
States' allies continue efforts to promote democratic changes in Cuba."
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that Title I's private
right of action should not only be postponed but permanently repealed. This
comment will illustrate that President Clinton's move to indefinitely suspend Title III's private right of action does not resolve the underlying
problems of the law, namely: (1) that Title I does not provide an effective
means to accomplish either of its objectives; (2) that Title HI's passage and
enforcement has resulted in a tit-for-tat legal retaliation against the United
States from its strongest trading partners; and (3) that Title Ill's attempt to
impose U.S. foreign policy on other nations violates international law, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), and the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").
Part I of this comment chronicles the historical events leading to the
promulgation of the Helms-Burton Act. Part II provides an overview of Title I of the Helms-Burton Act. Part I then analyzes Title III and describes why Title III will not protect the property rights of U.S. citizens or
deter enough foreign business investment in Cuba to expedite the collapse
of Castro's regime. Next, Part IV details the it-for-tat legal retaliation that
has stemmed from Title I's enactment, and Part V discusses the legality of
Title mI's private right of action. Finally, Part VI recommends that Title
I's private right of action should be permanently repealed and proposes an
alternative mechanism that would accomplish Title II's objectives.
I.

HISTORICAL EVENTS LEADING TO THE PROMULGATION OF THE
HELMS-BURTON ACT

This section chronicles the historical events leading to the promulgation of the Helms-Burton Act. These events include: (1) the Cuban government's confiscation of foreign and domestic property in Cuba during the
early 1960s; (2) the U.S. government's certification of claims against the
Cuban government; (3) the enactment of the U.S. embargo against Cuba
and its resulting impact on Cuba's economy; and (4) the Cuban government's shooting down of two unarmed civilian aircrafts, belonging to
"Brothers to the Rescue," a Miami-based anti-Castro group, on February
24, 1996.
1 Steven Lee Myers, One Key Element in Anti-Cuba Law PostponedAgain,N. Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 4, 1997, at Al; Barry Schweid, Clinton Decides to Waive Cuba Sanctions Again,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., July 16, 1997; Clinton Extends Title III ofHelms-Burton Act,
NAT'L J.'s CONGRESs DAILY, Jan. 16, 1998. The impetus behind the second six-month sus-

pension appears to be the European Union resolution, adopted on December 2, 1996, which
urges Cuba to improve its policies on human rights and political freedoms. See Myers, supra. Although the European Union has not pledged to curtail trade with Cuba, it has promised to suspend all of its agreements with Cuba if Castro's regime commits a serious breach
of human rights in the future. Stanley Meisler, Clinton Extends His Suspension of AntiCastroLawAnother 6 Months, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1997, at A6.
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A.

The Cuban Government's Confiscation of Foreign and Domestic
Property in Cuba
Shortly after Fidel Castro overthrew the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1958, the Cuban government promulgated a series of laws that led to
the confiscation of foreign and domestic property in Cuba.12 The first such
law was the Agrarian Reform Act of 1959, which was passed by Castro's
government in June 1959.13 The Agrarian Reform Act limited ownership of
land in the agricultural and cattle industry to small and medium sized farms
and cooperatives; all large farms in excess of 400 hectares were expropriated by the Cuban government. 14 Shortly thereafter, in October 1959, Castro's regime passed a new mineral law which required owners of mineral
and mining rights to re-register their claims with the Cuban government
within 120 days.1 5 Because the law's conditions made it all but impossible
for anyone to comply, the Cuban government ultimately confiscated a large6
number of the mineral and mining rights held by individuals in Cuba.1
Moreover, although petroleum was not subject to the mining law,' 7 many
foreign-owned oil refineries were subsequently confiscated by Castro's
government pursuant to a petroleum law which was adopted in November
1959.18
The rate of confiscations of foreign and domestic property in Cuba accelerated after the Cuban government entered into a trade agreement with
the Soviet Union in February 1960.'9 Pursuant to the agreement, the Soviets agreed to purchase five million tons of sugar over a period of five years
from the Cuban government.20 In exchange, the Cuban government agreed
to buy the Soviets' crude oil, rather than oil imported from Western oil
companies.2 ' However, in June 1960, the agreement was hampered when
U.S. oil companies in Cuba refused to process the crude oil sent from the
Soviets.22 Castro retaliated by seizing the refineries that had refused to process the Soviet's crude oil. 23

12 See DIANNE E. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, CUBA: U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,
CRS REPORT No. 92-63IF, at 2 (1995). On January 6, 1959, Castro's regime was officially
recognized by the United States as being the legitimate government of Cuba. Id.
13MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN

PRIVATE PROPERTY

14 .d

75-77 (1976).

15Id. at 79.
161d. at 79-82.
171d. at 80.
'81d. at 80-82.
19
RENNACK
20
21

22

23

& SULLIVAN, supranote
GORDON, supranote 13, at 88.

12, at 2; GORDON, supranote 13, at 85.

1d.

RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supranote 12, at 2; GORDON, supra note 13, at 94.

RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supra note 12, at 2; GORDON, supra note 13, at 95.
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On July 6, 1960, an angered President Eisenhower responded to Castro's actions by significantly reducing Cuba's sugar quota in the United
States.24 On the same day, Castro retaliated by passing a decree which
authorized the confiscation of all properties in Cuba owned by U.S. citizens.2 S Shortly thereafter, on October 13, 1960, the Cuban government
passed the Urban Reform Act, which authorized the confiscation of virtually all the remaining foreign and domestic business property in Cuba.26
Thus, by 1961, Castro's regime had effectively confiscated all the private
property in Cuba's productive sector. 27
B. The Certification of Claims Against the Cuban Government
Although the United States recognizes the law of eminent domain and
acknowledges that foreign nations have the right to take property for public
purposes, it is well established that such a right is "coupled with the corresponding obligation.., that such taking [be] accompanied by payment of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation." 28 Because the vast majority of the U.S. citizens whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government have not been compensated for their losses, 29 U.S. courts have held
that the Cuban government's confiscation of U.S. property without compensation was a violation of international law.3"
Thus, in order to provide the Secretary of State with accurate information on the U.S. nationals' claims against the Cuban government and
thereby facilitate the future settlement of such claims, the U.S. Congress
amended Title V of the International Claims settlement Act of 1949 on
October 16, 1964.31 The amendment: (1) enabled U.S. nationals who had
24

Presidential Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960); RENNACK & SULLIVAN,
supra note 12, at 2; GORDON, supra note 13, at 98-99.
2RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supra notel2, at 2; GORDON, supra note 13, at 99-101.
26

GORDON, supra note 13, at 103. The Urban Reform Act effectively nullified leases
pertaining to urban property and prohibited the free alienation of such property. Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarityAct: Hearings on S. 381 and H.R. 927 Before the Subcomm.
on W. Hemisphere and Peach Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
104th Cong. 132 (1995) (statement of Ignacio E. Sanchez, Att'y, Kelly Drye & Warren),
available
in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 357720 [hereinafter Sanchez].
27
2

GORDON, supra note 13, at 106.

1Id. at 124.

29

Matias F. Traviesco-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of US Na-

tionals' ExpropriationClaimsAgainst Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 659, 662 (1996).
3

1d. at 664-5 (citing Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1983),
affd mem., 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM'N, FINAL
REPORT OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM 69 (1972) [hereinafter FCSC FINAL REPORT].
31
FCSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 30, at 70; 22 U.S.C. § 16431 (1996). The Intemational Claims Settlement Act of 1949 "created the International Claims Commission, now
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and gave it jurisdiction to make final and binding decisions with respect to claims by United States nationals against settlement funds."
Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

18:217 (1997)

property taken without compensation by the Cuban government on or after
January 1, 1959 to file claims against the Cuban government; and (2)
authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FCSC") to assess
the value and legitimacy of the U.S. nationals' claims.32
Accordingly, between 1965 and 1972, individuals who had property
confiscated by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959, and who
were either U.S. citizens at the time their property was taken, or corporations or other legal entities that were organized under the laws of the United
33
States at the time of the taking, were eligible to file claims with the FCSC.
In total, the FCSC certified 5,911 claims, valued at $1.8 billion.34 Although
32

33

1d. at 69.

d. at 70, 79, 95, 97. Thus, unlike the Helms-Burton Act, individuals who became U.S.
citizens after their property was confiscated by the Cuban government were not eligible to
file claims with the FCSC. See Michael W. Gordon, The Cuban Claims.Act: Progressin the
Development of a Visible Valuation Progress in the FCSC, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 625,

64034(1973).

FCSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 30, at 412. Of the certified claims, 898 were owned
by corporations and 5,013 by individuals. Id. The total amount of the 898 claims held by
corporations was valued at $1,578,498,839.55; the total amount of the 5,013 claims held by
individuals was valued at $221,049,729.14. Id. The total value of the claims today, calculated to reflect a six percent increase in interest each year since 1960, is $15 billion. Cuba:
Saying Boo to Helms Burton, ECONOMIsT, Oct. 19, 1996, at 49 [hereinafter Saying Boo To
Helms-Burton]. For a final analysis of the U.S. certified claims against the Cuban government, see Charts A and B below.
ChartA: Final Analysis of the U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba:
Total Number
Number of CertNumber of CertiValue of Certifled Claims Held
fled Claims Held
of Certified
fled Claim
Claims
by Individuals
by Corporations
1315
1252
63
$1,000 or less
$1001-$5000
$5,001-$10,000

195
100

1701
640

1896
740

$10,001-$25,000
$25,001-$50,000

134
89

593
325

727
417

259
208
51
$50,001$100,000
222
145
77
$100,001$250,000
130
74
56
$250,001$500,000
74
33
41
$500,001$1,000,000
131
39
92
Over $1,000,000
5,911
5,013
898
TOTAL
Source: Foreign Claims Settlement Comm'n, Final Report of the Cuban Claims Program
413 (1972).
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the Cuban government has reached compensation agreements with Mexican, British, Canadian, French, Italian, Spanish, and Swiss citizens who had
property confiscated by Castro's regime on or after January 1, 1959,3s no
such compensation has been paid to the U.S. certified claimants.36
C. The U.S. Embargo Against Cuba
In response to the Cuban government's confiscation of U.S. properties
in Cuba and its growing alliance with the Soviet Union, President Kennedy
imposed a full trade embargo against Cuba on February 3, 1961 . The
economic restrictions imposed by the U.S. embargo remained in force
throughout the 1960s. However, during the 1970s, the Ford and Carter
Administrations sought to normalize relations with the Cuban government
by easing the embargo's restrictions.38 Accordingly, U.S. subsidiaries in
foreign countries were given permission to trade with Cuba, and restrictions
on travel to Cuba were loosened.39
The loopholes created during the Ford and Carter Administrations were
closed in 1992 when the U.S. Congress enacted the Cuban Democracy Act
ChartB: Final Statistics on the Cuban Claims Program:
Filed Claims:
Type
Number Filed
Corporate
1,146
Individual
7,670
Totals
8,816
Denied Claims:
Type
Corporate
Individual
Totals
Awarded Claims:
Type
Corporate
Individual

Number Filed
248
947
1,195

Number Filed
898
5,013
5,911

Amount Claimed
$2,855,993,212.69
$490,413,058.67
$3,346,406,271.36

Amount Denied
$1,277,494,373.14
$269,363,329.53
$1,546,857,702.67

Amount Claimed
$1,578,498,839
$221,049,729
Totals
$1,799,548,568
j
Source: Foreign Claims Settlement Comm'n, Final Report of the Cuban Claims Program
412 (1972).
35 SayingBoo to Helms-Burton, supra note 34.
36Sanchez, supra note 26, at 133.
37Presidential Proclamation No. 3447, 22 U.S.C.S. § 2370 note; 27 Fed. Reg. 1085
(1962).
38The Cuba Freedom Pages, Factual Report: U.S. Embargo (visited Oct. 20, 1996)
<http:/www.jmbco.com./embargo.htm> [hereinafter FactualReport].
39Id.
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("CDA"). 40 The CDA both pressured the Cuban regime through tough economic sanctions and provided humanitarian aid to the Cuban people.4'
"Track one" of the CDA strengthened the U.S. embargo by preventing foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from trading with Cuba.42 At the
same time, "track two" decreased the isolation of the Cuban people by
opening up telephone, mail, and other forms of communication to and from
Cuba, and by allowing medicine and other forms of humanitarian assistance
from the United States to enter Cuba.4 3
D. The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Cuba's Economy
Prior to 1992, the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba did not have a
drastic impact on Cuba's economy because Cuba annually received between $4 to $5 billion in the form of assistance and subsidies from the Soviet bloc. 44 However, Cuba lost these subsidies when the Soviet bloc fell in
1992.45 The loss of Soviet aid, coupled with the enactment of the CDA,
caused the value of Cuba's imports to decline by seventy-five percent and
Cuba's Gross National Product to diminish by a third.46 The effect on
Cuba's economy has been devastating.4 7
In order to acquire capital and thereby bolster Cuba's failing economy,
Castro's regime has been forced to solicit foreign business investment in
Cuba; Castro's regime now offers foreign investors the opportunity to enter
into joint ventures using Cuban property and assets - some of which were

40

The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, Title XVII (codified
as 22
U.S.C. § 6001-10 (1992)) [hereinafter CDA].
41

The Clinton Administration's Reversal of U.S. Immigration Policy Toward Cuba:
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations,

104th Cong. 88-89 (1995) (statement of Peter Tamoff, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs) [hereinafter Tamoff].
42
1d. at 88. In 1991, trade between U.S. subsidiaries in foreign countries and the Cuban
government amounted to $700 million for that year alone. Id. As a result of the CDA, trade
between
U.S. subsidiaries and the Cuban government amounts to nothing today. Id.
43
Id. The CDA also prohibited any vessel that entered a Cuban port from loading or discharging anywhere in the United States within 180 days after departing from Cuba. CDA,
supra note 40, §6005. This provision, among others, angered the United States' closest
trading partners and allies, who viewed the Act as flagrantly extraterritorial. See Trevor t.
Jefferies, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: A Rotten Carrot and a Broken Stick?, 16

Hous. J. INT'L L. 75, 96 (1993). It is not clear whether the CDA was "a congressional attempt to encourage Cuban democratic reform in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise"
or rather "a response to the influence of powerful Cuban-American groups waiting to take
power when Castro either voluntarily steps down or is overthrown." Id. at 76.
44Tamoff, supra note 41, at 85. Soviet aid constituted approximately 50% of Cuba's
Gross
National Product at that time. Id.
45
RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supra note 12.
46The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, ECONOMIsT,
47

Aug. 27, 1994, at 19.

1Id. Cuba's trade deficit was $1.7 billion in 1996. Paula L. Green, Cuba Adjusts to
New Economic Order,J. COM., Jan. 28, 1997, at 3A.
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confiscated from U.S. citizens in the 1960s. 48 To date, there are 260 joint
ventures in Cuba, 49 and more than 650 foreign companies (representing
$2.1 billion in foreign investment) have investments in Cuba °
In addition to courting foreign investment, Castro's regime has also
been forced to implement a number of democratic changes on the island.
Since 1993, the Cuban government has legalized trade with U.S. dollars, increased the opportunity for self-employment in certain occupations, turned
over state farms to cooperatives and families, and authorized farmers to sell
produce on the open market.5 1
Unfortunately, the Cuban government has not made similar improvements in the area of human rights. Under Castro's regime, freedom of association and freedom of speech are not recognized liberties. Individuals
who oppose the regime often suffer beatings by regime-directed mobs
and/or economic discrimination in the form of layoffs, blacklisting, and loss
of benefits.5 3 These tactics have had the effect of marginalizing and fragmenting the recent democratic movements from within Cuba.
E. Cuba's Shootdown of Two Unarmed Civilian Aircrafts
Although the United States has continually condemned the Cuban government for its past and present violations of human rights, 55 the main
catalyst behind the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act occurred on February 24, 1996, when Cuban MiG fighters shot down two unarmed civilian
aircrafts carrying four Miami-based anti-Castro exiles.5 6 Prior to the shootdown, neither the Secretary of State5 7 nor President Clinton58 supported the
enactment of the Helms-Burton Bill ("the Bill"). However, the brutal
shootdown of the two small planes provoked strong anti-Communist senti-

48

Sanchez, supra note 26, at 133-34; Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 301(6). See
Cuba: Foreign Investment Act of 1995, 35 I.L.M. 331 (1995), for a description of the legal
basis
49 of Cuba's joint venture system.
Green, supra note 47. Since the Helms-Burton Act went into effect, a total of 40 new
joint ventures in Cuba have been formed. John Pearson & Gail DeGeorge, Cuba Trade: This
Hornet's Nest Is Really Buzzing, Bus. WK., Nov.25, 1996, at 58. Moreover, an additional
143 joint ventures are currently being negotiated. Saying Boo To Helms-Burton, supra note
34
4Their Men in Havana,ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at SC12.
51
Fedarko, supra note 1.
52
Tamoff, supranote 41, at 86-88.
53
Id.
5Id.
55

1d.

56

Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 116.
57See 141 CONG. REc. S15106-01, S15108 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1995) (statement of Warren 58
Christopher).

Cutting Ourselves on Cuban Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 26 [hereinafter
CubanPolicy].
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ment, especially in the electorally-vital state of Florida, and thereby
prompted political support for the Bill to be consolidated.5 9
On March 5, 1996, just ten days after the shootdown, the Senate approved the Bill by a vote of 74 to 22.60 Thereafter, on March 6, 1996, only
eleven days after the shootdown, the House approved the Bill by a vote of
336 to 86.61 Following suit, President Clinton signed the Bill into law on
March 12, 1996, a mere seventeen days after the shootdown, in exchange
for a "compromise waiver" which delayed Title Ill's effective date until
August 1, 1996 and gave the President the authority to suspend Title II's
private right of action for rolling periods of six months.62
President Clinton has utilized the "compromise waiver" to delay the
right to bring lawsuits under Title H four times and has indicated that he
will indefinitely suspend Title HI's private right of action so long as other
nations continue efforts to promote democratic changes in Cuba.63 The next

59
The Libertad Act: Implementation and InternationalLaw : Hearings on S. 381 and
H.R. 927 Before the Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm., 104th Cong. 38 (1996) (statement of Alberto J. Mora, Att'y)
[hereinafter Mora].
6 142 CONG. REc. D135, D135 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996).
61142 CONG. REc. D144,D146 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996).
62
Cuban Policy, supra note 58; see also supra notes 3 and 5. The "compromise waiver"
put President Clinton in a win-win position. First, by signing the Helms-Burton Act into
law, he gained support from many Cuban-Americans residing in Florida, a state where there
are 25 electoral votes. Second, by using the "compromise waiver" to indefinitely suspend
the right to bring lawsuits under Title III, he was able to strike a balance between CubanAmericans, who generally favor the law, and the United States' trading partners, who oppose
it. Indeed, it is interesting to note that President Clinton not only won Florida's 25 electoral
votes in the November 1996 election, he also acquired a larger percentage of the CubanAmerican vote than any other recent incumbent Democratic presidential candidate. See
Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Suspends ProvisionofLaw That Targets Cuba, WASH. POST,
Jan. 4, 1997, at Al. However, it should be noted that President Clinton's sweeping Florida
victory may also be attributable to the fact that Senator Dole neglected to campaign in Florida.63
See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. The President's decision to suspend
Title III, possibly indefinitely, invites speculation that he never supported the Act, but
merely signed it to appease the Republican Congress and Cuban-American voters. Indeed,
the speculation that special interest groups exerted pressure on President Clinton during the
November 1996 election is bolstered by a report which was conducted by the bipartisan
group Center For Public Integrity. See Tim Shorrock, Study Eyes Money Trail Behind
Helms-Burton, J.COMM., Jan. 24, 1997, at A3. The report concludes that Cuban exiles,
"supplied $3.2 million of the $4.4 million donated since 1979 to U.S. politicians who support
the U.S. economic boycott of Cuban leader Fidel Castro." Id. The report goes on to note
that the Cuban Foundation, which is led by Joise Mas Canosa, a well known Cuban exile, is
"dollar-for-dollar the most effective lobbying group in Washington," and that the money trail
"illuminates remarkable influence a relatively small faction has had on U.S. foreign policy
towards another nation." Id. The report also asserts that through large political donations
Mr. Canosa has influenced Congressional members such as Senator Helms and Representative Burton, the two sponsors of the Act, and that the "congressional staffers who drafted
Helms-Burton relied heavily on lawyers and lobbyists with ties to the Bacardi spirits em-

226
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section discusses the provisions of Title fI and why Title ImI should not
only be postponed but also permanently repealed.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE ITOF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT

A. The Purposes of Title III
The drafters of the Helms-Burton Act contend that Castro is currently
financing his totalitarian grip on Cuba by selling property and assets, some
of which were illegally confiscated from U.S. citizens during the 1960s.64
Thus, Title m seeks (1) to protect the property rights of U.S. citizens who
had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban government on or after
January 1, 1959 and (2) to expedite the collapse of Castro's regime by discouraging foreign business investment in Cuba. 65
B.

Who Is Eligible to Bring Suit Under Title I

Title III creates a private right of action allowing "U.S. nationals"
whose property 66 was confiscated

7

by the Cuban government on or after

January 1, 1959 to file suit in federal court against any U.S. or foreign entity that "traffics" 68 in such property. 69 The definition of "U.S. national" inpire." Id. Thus, in the light of the obvious political pressure to sign the Act and President
Clinton's subsequent suspension of Title III, it appears that President Clinton may have
signed the Act to bolster his chances of winning the November 1996 election, only to then
back away from enforcing the provision in an attempt to appease the United States' most
important trading partners.
64Helms-Burton
Act, supra note 2, § 301(5) & (6).
65
Tarnoff, supra note 41, at 92-93; Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 301(6).
66The term "property" means "any property (including patents, copyrights, trademarks,
and any other form of intellectual property), whether real, personal, or mixed, and any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest." Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 4(12). Real property used for residential
purposes does not constitute "property" unless: (1)the claim to the property is held by a U.S.
national and it has been certified by the FCSC; or (2) the property is occupied by an official
of the
67 Cuban government or the ruling political party in Cuba. Id.
The term "confiscated" is defined as
(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of
ownership or control of property, on or after January 1, 1959 (i) without the property
having been returned or adequate and effective compensation provided; or (ii) without
the claim to the property having been settled pursuant to an international claims settlement agreement or other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and (B) [the repudiation, default, or failure] of the Cuban Government to pay, on or after January 1,
1959 (i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; (ii) a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; or (iii) a debt
which is incurred by the Cuban Government in satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated property claim.
Helms-Burton
Act, supra note 2, § 4(4).
68
See supra note 4, for the definition of the term "traffics." Based on the definition of
"trafficking," confiscated property in Cuba that is currently being used, managed, or controlled by the Cuban government (e.g., schools, hospitals, military installations, and admin-
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cludes both U.S. citizens and legal entities which are organized under the
laws of the United States and have their principal place of residency in the
United States.7 ° Consequently, individuals who were U.S. citizens at the
time their property was taken, as well as Cuban-Americans who were Cuban nationals at the time of confiscation, can avail themselves of Title HI's
federal right of action.7 1

istrative offices) will clearly be subject to suit under Title III. The LibertadAct: Implementation andInternationalLaw: Hearingson S. 381 and H.R. 927 Before the Subcomm. on W.
Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs ofthe Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 104th Cong.

64 (1996) (statement of Robert L. Muse, Att'y) [hereinafter Muse]. However, the scope of
the term "trafficking" will ultimately have to be determined by the courts. EU to Hammer
U.S.FirmsIf Trade Law Nails Europe, SALT LAKE TRm., July 16, 1996, at Al [hereinafter
E.U.to Hammer U.S. Firms]. For example, it is open to question whether ownership of privately held stock in a corporation that is "trafficking" in confiscated property itself constitutes "trafficking." Id. Because ownership of publicly traded stock is exempt from the
definition of "trafficking," some commentators contend that ownership of privately held
stock in a corporation that is "trafficking" in confiscated property does constitute "trafficking."
69 Id.
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 302. Title III's federal right of action does not apply if (1) the property at issue was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after the enactment date of the Act (that is, after March 12, 1996), Id. § 302(a)(4)(C); or (2) if more than
two years has transpired since the action giving rise to the trafficking has ceased to occur, Id.
§ 305.
70
1d.
71

§ 4(15).

Although the United States does not confer similar rights on U.S. citizens who are former nationals of the other 38 countries in the world where there are currently outstanding
property claims, 142 CONG. REc. S1479, S1488 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Dodd), the Act's sponsors argue that the inclusion of Cuban-Americans in Title III is necessary to accomplish the Act's foreign policy objectives because the certified claims of U.S.
citizens only constitute 5% of the industrial and commercial properties in Cuba, Sanchez,
supra note 26, at 135. Thus, according to the Act's sponsors, the inclusion of CubanAmericans will limit the scope of properties available for investment and thereby further discourage foreign business investment in Cuba. Id. The Act's sponsors also contend that excluding Cuban-Americans from Title III's federal cause of action would violate the Equal
Protection guarantees of the U.S. Constitution. Id. (citing City of Clebume v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[W]hen a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin ...
[it is] subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if [it is] suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
(stating that the equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment)).
Opponents of Title III argue that including Cuban-Americans in Title III's remedy violates international law and that Cuban-Americans should adjudicate their claims in Cuban
courts. See Muse, supra note 68 (citing Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd. 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967) ("confiscations by a state of the property of its own nationals ...
do not constitute violations of international law"); Sanchez v.
Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985) (" ... international law
delineates minimum standards for the protection only of aliens; it does not purport to interfere with the relations between a nation and its own citizens"); U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Claim No. IT-10253, Dec. No. It-62 ("The principle of international law
that eligibility for compensation requires American nationality at the time of the loss is so
widely and universally accepted that citation to authority is scarcely necessary.")). Unfortu-
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However, individuals who were U.S. citizens at the time that their
property was taken cannot avail themselves of Title HI's private right of action if they did not file a claim with the FCSC between 1965 and 1972, or if
they filed a claim during that period which was denied by the FCSC. 72
Moreover, Cuban-Americans who were Cuban nationals at the time of the
taking cannot bring claims under Title III until two years after Title I's effective date (that is, until August 1, 1998). 73
nately, under this viewpoint, Cuban-Americans would be unable to resolve their property
claims because Cuban law currently prohibits exiles from asserting property claims in Cuban
courts. See Alexander Mills & Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist
Cuba, 27 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 137, 158-59 (1985).

Finally, opponents of Title III argue that the definition of "U.S. national," which includes
Cuban-Americans who were not U.S. citizens at the time of the taking but are now naturalized U.S. citizens, as well as Cuban legal entities which were not incorporated in the United
States at the time of the taking but are now organized under the laws of the United States and
have their principle place of business in the United States, is so broad that it allows individuals who are not currently U.S. citizens to incorporate themselves in the United States and
avail themselves of Title III's federal right of action. See Letter from David Wallace,
Chairman & CEO, Lone Star Industries, to Hon. Christopher J. Dodd (Oct. 5, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S15005, S15010 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Wallace
Letter]; 141 CONG. REc. S15106-01, S15113 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dodd). This scenario is entirely possible because Cuban-Americans who were Cuban nationals at the time of the taking were not eligible to file claims with the FCSC between 1965
and 1972. See supra note 33. Accordingly, Cuban-Americans who were Cuban nationals at
the time of the taking are not precluded from availing themselves of Title III's private right
of action
simply because they did not previously file a claim with the FCSC.
72
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 302(a)(5)(A)-(B).
73
1d. § 302(a)(5)(C). The Act further provides that if Title III cases are consolidated, or
if a pool of assets is created, then U.S. citizens who have claims certified by the FCSC will
be entitled to full payment on their claims before the claims of Cuban-Americans are satisfied. Id. § 302(f)(2)(B). Despite this provision, opponents of Title III argue that the Cuban
government's liability expands considerably as a result of Cuban-Americans being added to
Title III's remedy, and therefore: (I) the pool of assets available to U.S. certified claimants
will be diluted; (2) the prospects of U.S. certified claimants settling their claims with the Cuban government will be decreased; (3) the effective nullification of the claims of U.S. certified claimants constitutes a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment "Takings Clause"; and (4)
the U.S. government (or rather, the U.S. taxpayers) will be required to pay just compensation
to U.S. certified claimants. Muse, supra note 68, at 67; 142 CONG. REc. S1485, S1487-88
(daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 225, 260-61 (1980) ('The Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the
Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts."); Langenegger v. United
States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1572-73 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the extinguishment of a claim can amount
to a "taking" of property if the involvement of the United States is "sufficiently direct and
substantial;" "sufficiently direct and substantial involvement" is determined by assessing: (1)
the nature of the U.S. activity; and (2) the benefit derived by the United States). But see
Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983) (President's settlement of plaintiff's claims against the People's Republic of China without Plaintiff's consent did not give
rise to a cause of action under the "Takings Clause" of the U.S. Constitution for the difference between what plaintiff received under the settlement and what plaintiff believed the
claim was worth); Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572 (holding that the United States was not
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C.

Requirements That Must Be Satisfied By Eligible Title III Claimants
In order to bring a Title III suit, eligible claimants must (1) have a
claim valued in excess of $50,000 at the time of the taking; 74 (2) prove that
the defendant(s) "knowingly and intentionally" trafficked in their confiscated property; 7 (3) comply with the jurisdictional and procedural require76
ments of 28 U.S.C. Section 1331, the general federal jurisdiction statute;
(4) effectuate service of process in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Section
1608;77 and (5) pay a filling fee which is "established at a level sufficient to
recover the costs of court actions. 7 8
D. Liability Under Title HI
Title HI plaintiffs may recover money damages from liable defendants
in the amount which is the greater of (1) the amount certified to the claimant by the FCSC, plus interest; (2) an amount determined by the FCSC or a
court-appointed master to be the value of the claim, plus interest; or (3) the
fair market value of the property in question, calculated as being either the
current value of the property, or the value of the property when confiscated
plus interest, whichever is greater.79 Title I further provides that if a U.S.
certified claimant gives thirty-day advance notice to the defendant before
commencing a Title I action, and the defendant nonetheless continues to
traffic in the property in question, then the defendant will be liable to the
plaintiff for treble damages.8 0

responsible under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment for the expropriation of a U.S. citizen's property in a foreign land when hemispheric stability was an ultimate
benefit hoped for by the United States).
74
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 302(b). The Act's sponsors added the $50,000
"amount in controversy" requirement in response to criticism that the inclusion of CubanAmericans would cause a flood of litigation in U.S. federal courts. See 142 CONG. REC.
S1479, S1504 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coverdell).
75
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 4(13). The term "knowingly" is defined as "with
knowledge or having reason to know." Id. § 4(9).
76
1d. § 302(c)(1). Title III further provides that the Act of State Doctrine, which prohibits U.S. courts from adjudicating the acts of foreign governments, Underhill v. Hemandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), does not apply to causes of action brought under Title III, Id. §
302(a)(6). See Sanchez, supra note 26,at 136-38, for a discussion of the applicability of the
Act of State Doctrine. See also Banco de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); 22
U.S.C. § 2307(e)(2).
77Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 302(c)(2).
7
"1d. § 302(h)(2)(i).
79Id.
§ 302(a)(1)(A).
0
Id. § 302(a)(3).
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H. THE REALITY OF TITLE III
A. Title HI Will Not Protect the Property Rights of U.S. Citizens
As mentioned previously, one of Title III's primary goals is to vindicate the property rights of U.S. citizens who had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959.8'
Unfortunately, Title Hm does not provide an effective remedy because: (1)
many U.S. citizens cannot avail themselves of Title HI's private right of action due to the $50,000 "amount in controversy" requirement; and (2) Title
mI's other restrictions further constrict the availability of the remedy.
1. Many U.S. Citizens CannotAvail Themselves of Title III's Private
Right of Action Due to the $50,000 "Amount in Controversy" Requirement
The Act's sponsors added a $50,000 "amount in controversy" restriction to Title Il's private right of action in response to criticism that the inclusion of Cuban-Americans would cause a flood of litigation in U.S.
federal courts.8 2 However, as a result of the "amount in controversy" requirement, gaining access to U.S. federal courts will be difficult for individuals who were U.S. citizens at the time that their property was
confiscated because the FCSC has already assigned particular values to
their claims. Because eighty-six percent of the U.S. claimants' property has
already been certified by the FCSC as having a value of $50,000 or less,
only 816 certified claimants (fourteen percent of all certified claimants) will
be able to avail themselves of Title Il's private right of action. 83 Accordingly, 5,095 certified claims will remain unsettled.8
Moreover, although the FCSC has not already attached values to the
claims of Cuban-Americans, the $50,000 "amount in controversy" requirement will nonetheless preclude many Cuban-Americans from suing because
the FCSC or a court-appointed master must determine the value of their
claims at the time of the taling.85 The court will not accept as conclusive
any findings, orders, judgments, or decrees declaring the value of the claim
unless the declaration is found pursuant to a binding international arbitration to which the United States or the claimant submits the claim.86 Hence,
Cuban-American claimants will not be able to evade the $50,000 "amount
in controversy" requirement merely by alleging a claim in excess of

81

Tarnoff, supra note 41, at 92-93.
See 141 CONG. REC. S1479, S1504 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cover-

82

dell).
83

See supra note 34.

84Id.
85

86

Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 303(a)(2).

1d. § 303(a)(3).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

18:217 (1997)

$50,000.7 Accordingly, those Cuban-Americans with claims having a
value of $50,000 or less will likewise be unable to avail themselves of Title
HI's private right of action. 88
Because Title III provides that defendants can be liable to U.S. claimants for treble damages, 8 9 some commentators have argued that U.S. claim-

ants will be able to gain access to U.S. courts by alleging that the amount of
the damages sought is the value of the property trebled.90 It is uncertain
whether the courts would allow U.S. claimants to aggregate damages to
satisfy the $50,000 "amount in controversy" requirement. 91 The question is
moot, however, because Title I in its final form does not allow treble
92
damages to be included in the calculation of the "amount in controversy.,
Moreover, even if treble damages could be included, the $50,000 "amount
in controversy" requirement would still preclude over 4,000 certified claimants from availing themselves of Title mI's remedy.93 Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that a group of claimants with a number of minor claims, which
in the aggregate do not exceed $50,000, may be able to evade the "amount
in controversy" requirement by forming a "class action" and "piggyback94
ing" on a U.S. claimant who has a claim valued in excess of $50,000.
However, it should be noted that this avenue of relief is speculative at best.
87

But see Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995) ("In order for
a court to refuse jurisdiction 'it [must] appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for
less than the jurisdictional amount."').
88
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has estimated that there may be between
75,000 and 200,000 claims held by Cuban-Americans. SECRETARY OF STATE, REPORT
CONCERNING THE CuBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRTIc SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996
(Sept. 27, 1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. S12441, S12441 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1996)
[hereinafter Senate Report]. The total value of these claims has been estimated to be as high
as $94 billion. Wallace Letter, supra note 71, at S15010.
89

Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 302 (a)(3).
Letter from Robert L. Muse, Attorney for Amstar Property Rights Holding, Inc., U.S.
certified claimants, to June E. O'Neil, Director of CBO (Aug. 25, 1995), reprinted in 141
CONG. REC. S 15005, S 15013 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Muse Letter].
91
See Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that punitive
damage claims can be aggregated to satisfy "amount in controversy" requirement); accord
Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996); Earnest v. General Motors Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala. 1996); Brooks v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 924 F. Supp.
739 (M.D. La. 1996). See also Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335 ("In order for a court to refuse jurisdiction 'it [must] appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount."'). But see Bishop v. General Motors Corp., 925 F.Supp. 294 (D.N.J. 1996)
(holding that punitive damage claims cannot be aggregated to satisfy the "amount in controversy" requirement).
92
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 302(b).
93
See supra note 34.
94
See generally Satumino E. Lucio, II, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1995: An InitialAnalysis, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv., 325, 342 n.
25 (1995) ("It is open to question whether a 'class action' by a group of U.S. nationals
holding a number of minor claims, which in the aggregateexceed $50,000, can commence a
lawsuit pursuant to the Cuban Liberty Act.") (emphasis added). See also Stromberg Metal
90
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2.

Title III's Other RestrictionsFurtherConstrictthe Availability of the
Remedy

Even if claimants pass the $50,000 "amount in controversy" requirement, they will still have to overcome a plethorapf other hurdles in order to
avail themselves of Title III's federal right of action. First, because U.S.
citizens are prohibited by U.S. law from visiting Cuba, it will be difficult
for U.S. claimants to determine how their property is being used.95 Accordingly, it will be hard for U.S. claimants to obtain basic information,
identify potential traffickers, 96 and prove that defendants are "knowingly"
trafficking in their property. 97 Second, Cuban-Americans who were Cuban
nationals at the time of confiscation can only avail themselves of Title III's
remedy if their claim is for real property that is being occupied by an official of the Cuban government.98 Again, this problem is accentuated because
it will be difficult for Cuban-Americans to ascertain how their property is
being used. Third, defendants must have U.S.-based subsidiaries or other
assets in the United States to meet Title I's jurisdictional requirements.
Because there are only 260 joint ventures in Cuba,99 and the majority of the
U.S. claims pertain to property that the Cuban government has not opened
to foreign investment,' it will be difficult for plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction over traffickers.10 ' Finally, plaintiffs will have to pay an expensive
filing fee, which some commentators have estimated will amount to approximately $4,500.'02 Thus, the cumulative effect is that only a small
number of individuals
will be able to avail themselves of Title M's federal
10 3
right of action.

Works, Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995);
Gilmer v. Walt Disney, 915 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Ark. 1996); Garza v. National. Am. Ins.
Co., 807 F. Supp. 1256 (M.D. La. 1992); Mark Hutchenson, Unintended Consequences: 28
U.S.C. § 1367's Effect on Diversity's Amount in Controversy Requirement, 48 BAYLOR L.
REv. 247 (1996).
95Steve Fainaru, U.S. Firms Haven't Closed Book on Cuba, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29,
1996, at Al.
96Mora, supra note 59, at 41.
97
See 141 CONG. REc. S15100, S15102 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Helms) (arguing that Title III will not cause a litigation explosion in U.S. courts).
98See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 2, § 4(12).
99 Green, supra note 47.
1'°Larry Rohter, Cubans Can Likely Evade U.S. Sanctions (last modified Mar. 3, 1996)
<http://www.latino.com/news/0303cubc.html>.
101 Mora, supra note 59, at 41-42.
102142 CONG. REC. S1479, S1500 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
103Id.
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B.

Title III Will Not Deter Enough Foreign Business Investment in Cuba
to Expedite the Collapse of Castro's Regime
Title rI also seeks to expedite the collapse of Castro's regime by discouraging foreign business investment in Cuba. 1' 4 For the reasons set forth
below, Title I will not deter enough foreign business investment in Cuba
to accomplish this objective.
1. JurisdictionalRequirements
First, foreign companies that do not have subsidiaries or assets in the
United States will not satisfy Title I's jurisdictional requirements and
therefore will not face potential liability under Title I. Accordingly, they
will not be discouraged from investing in Cuba. 05 Indeed, investment in
Cuba will be attractive to small foreign companies that cannot afford to
compete in the U.S. market. Because large foreign companies that have
subsidiaries in the United States may be reluctant to invest in Cuba, smaller
companies will have an unique opportunity to do business in Cuba without
competition from larger companies. Hence, Title I may actually promote
investment in Cuba that would not have otherwise occurred.10 6 Moreover,
foreign companies that have subsidiaries in the United States may choose to
pull out of the United States rather than Cuba. For example, Sol Melia, a
Spanish company that is building an immense hotel complex in Cuba, has
announced that it is pulling its assets out of the United States in order to
avoid potential liability under Title Hi. 07
2. The Little Known Loophole
Another reason why foreign investors will continue to invest in Cuba is
that there is great incentive to settle Title I actions because (1) plaintiffs
are required to pay an expensive filing fee and obtain difficult evidentiary
information; (2) defendants are confronted with the possibility of treble
damages if the action is brought to fruition versus the cost of millions of
dollars if they pull out of Cuba; and (3) Section 302(a)(7) of the HelmsBurton Act provides that individuals do not have to obtain a license or permission from any U.S. agency to render and enforce a Title I out-of-court
settlement. 08 Thus, claimants and defendants are likely to render and en1'4Tarnoff, supra note 41, at 92-93.
105For example, Canada's Sherritt International, a corporation which has no assets in the
United States, announced on November 12, 1996, that it had raised $506 million to finance
prospective ventures in Cuba. See Pearson & DeGeorge, supranote 49.
106142 CoNG. Rac. E1247-02, E1248 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
107
Debra Beachy, Sanctions on Cuba Rile Mexico, Europe, Hous. CHRON., May 31,
1996, at 1.
10 Lois F. Desloge, The Great Cuban Embargo Scam - A Little Known Loophole Will
Allow the Richest Exiles to Cash In, WASH. POST., Mar. 3, 1996, at 7.
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force settlement judgments pursuant to Section 302(a)(7), and foreign companies are likely to perceive the settlement costs as simply another cost of
doing business. °9 Therefore, foreign companies will continue to invest in
Cuba as long as the costs of settling are less than the costs of pulling out of
Cuba.110 Indeed, one commentator has argued that the loophole may actually spark an influx of new foreign investment in Cuba because U.S. citizens who hold claims to property in Cuba "could shop around the world for
prospective investors in Cuba and offer them a full release on their property
claim in exchange for a 'sweetheart' lawsuit settlement entitling them to a
piece of the economic action.""' Accordingly, Title I may actually open
a back door that allows some Americans to get around the U.S. embargo
against Cuba because U.S. citizens and companies who are tempted to file
suit in court may instead settle out of court for a percentage of any venture
between a foreign company and Cuba and thereby become investors in
Cuba.
References to Title III's loophole were frequently cited in the congressional debates concerning the Act's enactment.'12 Thus, it is apparent that
both Congress and the President were aware of the loophole. Accordingly,
it is interesting to note that Nick Gutierrez, an attorney who represented the
National Association Sugar Mill Owners of Cuba and the Cuban Association for the Tobacco Industry, and Ignacio Sanchez, an attorney whose firm
represents the Bacardi Rum Company, helped write the Act. 13 Thus, the
enactment of Title III's loophole invites speculation that special interest
groups may have exerted pressure on congressional members and the President during the Act's promulgation, which incidentally transpired during
the critical months before the November 1996 election.
3. RetaliatoryMeasures
The final and most important reason why foreign investors will not be
discouraged from investing in Cuba is that Title I's deterrent effect has
been significantly weakened by counter-measures which have been adopted
by U.S. trading partners. For example, on September 19, 1996, the Mexican Senate unanimously approved an antidote law to the Helms-Burton Act
which is entitled "Law to Protect Trade and Investment from International
Standards Violating International Law."' 1 4 Pursuant to the law, a Mexican
company will be fined up to $300,000 if the company complies with the

109Id.
"lfd.
2

See, e.g. 142 CONG. REC.
113 Desloge, supra notel08.
1

E308, E309-10 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996).

14 Sanctions: Mexico Senate Approves Law CounteringHelms-Burton Measure, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1996), availablein WESTLAW, BNA-BTD database.
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Helms-Burton Act and pulls out of Cuba, or if the company submits information to U.S. courts under future Helms-Burton lawsuits.'15
Similarly, on November 28, 1996, the Canadian government (Cuba's
largest trading partner) 16 passed into law a piece of legislation entitled "An
Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act," otherwise known
as Bill C-54.1 7 The amendments to Bill C-54 permit the Canadian government to "block" Title IH judgments from being enforced or recognized
in Canada.1 8 The amendments also contain a "clawbacek" provision which
permits Canadian companies to seek compensation from domestic courts
for awards made against them in the United States pursuant to Title III, and
for reimbursement of court expenses incurred in both countries.' 19
Finally, on October 28, 1996, the European Union foreign ministers
promulgated a regulation on behalf of the fifteen European Union member
states which prohibits compliance with the Helms-Burton Act, and authorizes European companies doing business in Cuba to counter-sue offending
U.S. citizens and companies in European courts to recover damages
awarded in U.S. courts under Title rn.o20 These counter-measures provide a
great deal of protection to foreign investors and therefore make deterrence
from investing in Cuba an unlikely scenario.
IV.

TITLE

rH HAS HAMPERED RELATIONS

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES

AND ITS TRADING PARTNERS

Perhaps even more problematic than the fact that the purposes behind
Title rH are incapable of being achieved is that Title HI has hampered relations between the United States and its trading partners. Virtually all the
U.S. trading partners have strenuously objected to Title I's extraterritorial
effects.' 2 1 Specifically, the European Union views Title I as contrary to
the GATT, and has challenged the law before a dispute settlement panel of

115Id.

116 Howard Schneider, Canada and Cuba: Booming Partners;Despite U.S. Obstacles,
Trade, Diplomacy Flourish,WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1996, at Al; CanadianParliamentRatifies Response to Helms-Burton Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 4, 1996), availablein
WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
117 Sanctions: Canada Introduces Legislation to Counter Helms-Burton Law, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 28, 1996), availablein WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
18

Id.

1191d.

120 Stephen Bates & John Palmer, EU United in Defiance of U.S. Curbs, THE GUARDIAN,
Oct. 29, 1996, at 14.
121Specifically, the European Union, Canada, Mexico, India, Switzerland, Australia, and
the Rio Group of Latin American countries all object to the implementation and enforcement
of Title III's private right of action. See US. Blocks First EU Attempt to Place HelmsBurton Law Before WTO Panel,Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) 1643 (Oct. 23, 1996); Des Clifford,
The Cuban Itch, MINNG J., Nov. 1996, at 242; Mark Tran, Europe Takes U.S. to Court Over
Cuba, GUARDIAN, Nov. 21, 1996, at 15.
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the WTO.122 Similarly, the Canadian and Mexican governments have filed
a complaint that Title I violates the NAFTA.12 Title rI has also been
criticized as being a "secondary embargo," and has been compared to the
Arab boycott against corporations that traded with Israel - a boycott the
United States viewed as illegal."'
Inspired by a feeling that the United States is trying to bully them, the
United States' trading partners have begun to engage in a "tit-for-tat" with
the United States. Indeed, the European Union has stated that it may bar
American executives who are involved in future Title I litigation from
entering the fifteen European Union member states. 12s European foreign
ministers have even begun compiling a "watch list" of U.S. companies that
are potential litigants under Title I.26 Moreover, the Canadian Parliament
has introduced a piece of legislation entitled "The American Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Loyalty) Bill," generally referred to as the GodfreyMilliken Bill, which, if enacted, would allow the descendants of Tories,
whose property was confiscated without compensation by the Continental
Congress during the American Revolution, to file suit in Canadian court
against any entity that it is "trafficking" in such property. 127 The law would
also forbid "traffickers" from entering Canada until the debt on the property
in question is paid.'28
Accordingly, it is apparent that U.S. citizens may incur more retribution than compensation pursuant to Title ]n. 129 Moreover, the actions taken
by the United States' trading partners underscore the dangerous precedent
that Title I has set. Indeed, it is conceivable that an Arab country, using
Title I as precedent, could allow Palestinians, whose property was allegedly confiscated without compensation by the Israeli government, to file
suit in Palestinian court against U.S. companies that are "trafficking" in

raThe European Union challenged the law at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Meeting on November 20, 1996. Id. On February 20, 1997, the WTO established a threemember dispute panel to pass judgment on Title III. David E. Sanger, U.S. Won't Offer
Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al.
12 E. U. To Hammer U.. Firms,supra note 68.
124David L. Rabin, Clinton Couldn't Decide Where To Jump, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 19, 1996,
at A17.
15Bates
& Palmer, supranote 120.
26
1 1d.

127 Martin Dyckman, A Thorn in the Sides of Canadians,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 27,
1996, at 30. It has been reported that one women has documented proof that her ancestors
were wrongfully confiscated of 700 acres of land in what is now Washington, D.C. Id. Accordingly, if the Godfrey-Miliken Bill is enacted into law, then it is conceivable that President Clinton, among others, could be sued for "trafficking" in confiscated property. Id.

128id.

129James U. Goldsborough, Dealing with the Helms-Burton Mess,
TRm, Oct. 10, 1996, at B16.
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such property. 130 Similarly, the German government could pass a law allowing Chechens to sue Finnish companies that are "trafficking" in Russian
property.1

Ironically, the only individual who appears to benefit from the United
States' passage and enforcement of Title III is Fidel Castro himself. Title
III may actually have the effect of allowing Castro's regime to remain in
power because as long as Title i's private right of action remains in place,
it allows Castro to continuously point to the actions of the U.S. government
as the reason for Cuba's current economic crisis. Because Castro's regime
currently provides free health-care and education to its citizens,' 32and, as
discussed below, the legality of Title I's private right of action is quesis a great hero who is
tionable, it appears to the Cuban people that Castro
133
being unfairly attacked by the U.S. government.
V.

THE LEGALITY OF TITLE ImI

As mentioned previously, the recent actions of the United States' trading partners call into question the legality of Title III's private right of action. This section analyzes the possible legal challenges to Title III's
private right of action and concludes that the provision violates international law, the GATT, and the NAFTA.
A.

Possible Challenges Under GATT

Title III's private right of action violates GATT Article XI, which prohibits burdensome, non-tariff measures. 3 4 Because Title 1II suits must be
initiated by private parties, and because many private parties will be unable
to avail themselves of Title III's private right of action for the reasons detailed previously, it is likely that Title I will be enforced inconsistently as
between different "traffickers. 1 35 Accordingly, Title In's private right of
action introduces difficulty and uncertainty into commercial relations because foreign companies which have assets in the United States are unable
to accurately assess their risk of liability for "trafficking" in confiscated
property. 3 6 This uncertainty is increased dramatically as a result of President Clinton's recent move to indefinitely suspend Title I's private right
130 Walter

Russel Mead, U.S. Policy in Cuba Reeks of 1962, TIMEs UNION, Nov. 29,

1996,3 at A21.
1 1id.

132 William

BI.

E.Debler, Cuba's Slow Crawl, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1996, at

133
142 CoNG. RFc. E1247-02, E1248 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
134 Kenneth L. Bachman et al., Anti-Cuba SanctionsMay Violate NAFTA, GAYT, NAT'L
L. J.,
March 11, 1996, at C3 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, Oct.
30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194) [hereinafter Bachman].
13"id.
36
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of action because foreign companies must now account in their risk calculus
for the possibility that Title I suits may be permitted in the future.
If the WTO panel rules that Title III is in fact a breach of WTO rules,
then the United States will have to declare that Title III is vital to the U.S.
national security - the only means of overriding a WTO verdict - or repeal Title III's private right of action altogether. 137 The Clinton Administration is currently taking the position that the WTO lacks jurisdiction over
Title I because Title III is not a trade issue, but rather one of national security. 138 However, this argument is spurious in a post cold war era, especially with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and Cuba's resulting loss of
subsidies. Moreover, the Chinese government poses a greater threat to the
U.S. national security than Cuba does due to its well documented human
rights abuses, its unfair trade policies, and its policy of exporting dangerous
arms to terrorist regimes around the world. 139 Nonetheless, the U.S. foreign
trade policy towards Cuba is in stark contrast with that towards China. Indeed, China currently has most favored trading status with the United
States. 140 Finally, if the United States invokes a national security defense,
then it will set a dangerous precedent for other countries to ignore WTO
rulings on the same pretext. 141 Accordingly, the effectiveness of the WTO
could be seriously hampered, and the United States could lose its ability to
challenge the unfair trade practices of other countries, if it ultimately decides to invoke a national security defense. 42
Fortunately, on April 11, 1997, the European Union backed away from
looming confrontation with the United States and agreed to suspend its legal action against the Helms-Burton Act for six months. 143 In return, the
Clinton Administration has agreed to try to persuade Congress to amend the
Act. 1 " However, it should be noted that this latest concession may just
postpone an inevitable confrontation between the United States and the
European Union because the Senate Foreign
1 45Relations Committee has
vowed to block any attempt to weaken the Act.

137Article XXI of the GAT states that a member country may take any action "it considers necessary for its national security interests." See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade,
art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194.
38
1 Sanger, supra note 122.
'39See 142 CONG. RFC. S1479,

S1501 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Fein-

gold).0

14 Id.

14'id.
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t43Gary G. Yerkey, US., E.U. Approve Plan to Resolve Dispute Over Helms-Burton, Officials Say, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 16, 1997), availablein WESTLAW, BNA-BTD
database.
144 id.
145Id.
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B. Possible NAFTA Challenges
Title DI also violates at least two of the United States' obligations under NAFTA. First, NAFTA Article 309 prohibits restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods destined to any NAFTA country that are
not in accordance with Article XI of GATT. 146 Thus, because Title I
places restrictions on the importation and exportation of goods destined to
Canada and Mexico, and because it violates Article X of GATT, the provision likewise violates Article 309 of NAFTA.' 47
Second, NAFTA Article 1105 states that NAFTA countries must treat
"investments of investors of another [NAFTA country] ... in accordance
with international law.' 148 Thus, Title HI may violate international law, and
therefore NAFTA Article 1105, because the provision allows naturalized
Cuban-Americans to sue Canadian and Mexican companies in U.S. courts
over properties expropriated when they were still Cuban citizens.49 It is a
well established and universally accepted principle of international law that
eligibility for compensation requires an individual to be a national of the
demanding state at the time of the loss.'s5 This point is underscored by the
fact that the FCSC itself has stated that "[t]he principle of international law
that eligibility for compensation requires American nationality at the time
of the loss is so widely understood and universally accepted that citation of
authority is scarcely necessary."' 5'
Although the United States does not confer similar rights to U.S. citizens who are former nationals of the other thirty-eight countries in the
world where there are currently outstanding property claims, 15 2 the Act's
sponsors argue that the inclusion of Cuban-Americans in Title I's private
right of action is necessary to accomplish the Act's foreign policy objectives because the certified claims of U.S. citizens only constitute five percent of the industrial and commercial properties in Cuba. 153 Thus,
according to the Act's sponsors, the inclusion of Cuban-Americans will
limit the scope of properties available for investment and thereby further
discourage foreign investment in Cuba.' 54 Nonetheless, Title HI still violates international law and NAFTA Article 1105 because international law
does not confer retroactive rights upon naturalized citizens. Moreover, the
Equal Protection guarantees of the U.S. Constitution demand that other national origin groups that have outstanding property claims, such as Iranian146Bachman, supra note 134, at C4 (citing NAFTA, art. 309).
1471d.

1481d. at C3 (citing NAFTA, art. 1105(1)).
149 ,id.
50
1 See supra note 71.
15lid.

152142 CONG. REC.

S1478, S 1488 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feingold).

153 Sanchez, supra note 26, at 135.
154Id.
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Americans, Chinese-Americans, and Polish-Americans, must now be given
a federal right of action similar to that provided by Title 111.1 55 Thus, because the United States does not currently provide similar rights as those
provided by Title Im to U.S. citizens who are former nationals of the other
thirty-eight countries in the world where there are currently outstanding
property claims,' 5 6 the U.S. court system may soon experience an influx of
Equal Protection suits. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the 84th Congress denied giving settlement
rights to individuals who were not U.S. citizens at the time they sustained
property losses in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, because the extension
of such eligibility would require that similar rights be given to other naturalized Americans. 5 7
Third, Title III may also violate international law, and therefore
NAFTA Article 1105, due to its extraterritorial effect. The concept of extraterritoriality denotes one country, in this case the United States, creating
and applying laws to foreign individuals and corporations whose actions are
legal under their domestic laws. 15 8 According to the general precepts of intemational law, a country may apply its own laws outside its borders if the
exercise of such jurisdiction is reasonable and the specific conduct which
occurs outside the state has a substantial effect within the state itself. 59
55
1 See

Muse, supra note 68, at 57. See also City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[W]hen a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin..
. [it is] subject to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if [it is] suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (stating that the
equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment).
16142 CONG. REC. S 1478, S1488 (daily ed. March 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
1

See 142 CONG. REC. S1479 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990).
1 REsTATEmn" (THIRD) OF FoRIGN RELATIONS LAW §§402-3 (1987). In order to de58

1 See
59

termine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable, the following factors must be
examined:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,
or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international, political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
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However, if a state applies its laws outside its borders in an extraterritorial
but reasonable manner, and the state's exercise of jurisdiction conflicts with
the interests of another state, then each state must examine its interests in
comparison to the interests of the other state.1 60 If one state clearly has a
greater interest in exercising jurisdiction, then the state with the greater inwith the lesser interest in the exercise of juterest should
161 defer to the state
risdiction.
Thus, the pertinent question is whether Title mI's extraterritorial reach
is reasonable, and if so, whether another state has a greater interest in exercising jurisdiction than does the United States. The "effects doctrine" provides that "any conduct having a direct, substantial, and unreasonably
foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce is deemed to be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.' 162 Accordingly, supporters of the Act claim that the provision's
extraterritorial reach is reasonable, and therefore subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, because the conduct of trafficking has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce.,' 163 Therefore, even though Title III's acts of trafficking occur entirely outside the
borders of the United States, and the United States' trading partners and
closest allies have strenuously objected to the provision's extraterritorial
reach, it is likely that the "effects doctrine" will be applied to Title III, and
the provision's extraterritorial reach will be deemed legal. Nonetheless,
even if the provision's reach is deemed legal, it is still unwise for the United
States to enforce the provision, because, as discussed previously, Title III's
implementation has set a dangerous precedent and has hampered relations
between the United States and its closest trading partners.
Finally, if a NAFTA dispute settlement panel is convened to pass
judgment on Title I, and the panel rules that Title HI is in fact a breach of
NAFTA rules, then the United States will be forced to repeal the provision
altogether, or, in the alternative, overrule the panel's findings by asserting a
national security defense.' 4 Again, if the United States decides to assert a
national security defense, then the floodgates could be opened for defendants in other cases to use national security as an excuse for breaking
NAFTA rules.

(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. §J 403(2)(a)-(h).
See id. § 403(3).
161id.

62
1 Christopher

Wall, Cross-BoarderDilemma: E.U. Action over Helms-Burton Would be
TIMES (London), July 16, 1996, at 28.
FIN.
a Mistake,
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l4North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14, 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art.
2102, 32 I.L.M. 289, 699-700 (1993).

Trade Policy and Election Year Politics
18:217 (1997)
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because of Title III's obvious defects, the provision's private right 16
of5
action should not only be postponed, it should be permanently repealed.
While President Clinton's move to indefinitely suspend Title II's private
right of action is certainly a step in the right direction, it does not resolve
the underlying problems of the provision. In the aftermath of President
Clinton's indefinite suspension, it remains problematic that Title Im does
not provide an effective means to accomplish either of its objectives; that
Title I's passage and enforcement has resulted in a tit-for-tat legal retaliation against the United States from its strongest trading partners; and that
Title M's private right of action violates international law, the GATT, and
the NAFTA. Furthermore, it is disturbing on an ethical level that the
United States is determined to violate international law when it pleases, yet
condemns other countries for doing so. 166 Indeed, the United States appears
to be taking advantage of its strength to bully other countries into submission with U.S. sanctions against Cuba. Thus, it is apparent that Title I's
defects can be resolved only by repealing the provision altogether.
Second, the outstanding expropriation claims of the U.S. certified
claimants should be resolved through the international claims settlement
procedures already in place. 167 That is, the President should exercise his
authority to act on behalf of the U.S. certified claimants and negotiate a settlement agreement with the Cuban government. 16' Indeed, most U.S. certified claimants would prefer that their claims be resolved through the
international claims settlement procedures already in place. 169 That is because the majority of the U.S. certified claimants are opposed to the HelmsBurton Act, arguing that their claims were expected to be resolved eventually by negotiations with Cuba, and that the inclusion of Cuban-Americans
who were Cuban nationals at the time of confiscation in Title III's private

165 On

January 7, 1997, the First Session of the 105th Congress introduced HR Bill 284,
which seeks to repeal the Helms-Burton Act. Legislative Calendar, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) (Jan. 15, 1997), availablein WESTLAW, BNA-BTD database.
'6See Thomas Byron III, Playing by the InternationalRules, LEGAL TimEs, Mar. 25,
1996, at 28 ("The U.S. government weakens its position as a moral leader, and weakens the
international legal system as well, when it ignores its international obligations. International
law applies to every country. Like Cuba, we ignore it at our peril.").
167For an excellent discussion concerning possible remedies in a negotiated settlement of
the U.S. certified claimants' outstanding property claims, see Traviesco-Diaz, supra note 29,
at 672-683.
68
1'
ee Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 681, 688 (1981) (Congress has demonstrated continuing acceptance of the President's claim settlement authority); See generally
Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 238, 239 (Cl. Ct. 1983) (In 1979, U.S. President Carter negotiated a settlement agreement regarding outstanding claims of U.S. nationals
against the People's Republic of China.).
169141 CONG. REc. S1479, S 1500 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
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right of action effectively dilutes their claims.170 Thus, because the Cuban
government has already reached compensation agreements with other
171
the United States should likewise
countries that had claims against it,
fully explore with Cuba the possibility of working out an agreement to
compensate the U.S. certified citizens.
However, it should be noted that the President probably will not negotiate a compensation agreement on behalf of the U.S. certified claimants before a democratic or transitional government is in place in Cuba. That is
because the United States is usually reluctant to negotiate with countries
with which it has no official diplomatic relations. 172 Moreover, as apractical matter, the Cuban government is at present virtually bankrupt.1" Accordingly, the Cuban government probably will not be able to offer a
compensation agreement to the U.S. certified claimants until either the embargo is lifted or considerably more foreign investment enters Cuba.' 74
Third, the outstanding property claims of Cuban-Americans who were
Cuban nationals at the time of confiscation should be settled through adjudication in Cuban courts. Again, it is unlikely that the claims of CubanAmericans will be resolved before a democratic or transitional government
is in place in Cuba because current Cuban law prohibits Cuban exiles from
asserting property claims in Cuban courts."7s However, unlike Title Ill,
such a policy would be in accordance with international law, and it would
avoid transforming the U.S. legal system into an instrument of foreign policy.
Finally, it should be noted that the Clinton Administration has taken
the position that Title I's private right of action is necessary to promote
democracy within Cuba. However, such a position is inconsistent with U.S.
foreign policy. As mentioned previously, the Chinese government poses a
greater threat to U.S. national security than Cuba does, and China has the
same human rights record as Cuba does, yet China has most favored trading
status with the United States. 76 Indeed, the Clinton Administration has
taken the position that increased trade and foreign investment will promote
democracy in China. 177 Accordingly, if the same rationale is applied to
Cuba, then Title I's objective of promoting democracy in Cuba may still

Letter, supra note 71, at S15012 ("This dramatic expansion of the claimant
pool would serve as a significant disincentive for a post-Castro Cuban Government to enter
into meaningful settlement negotiations with the United States given the sheer enormity of
the outstanding
claims and the practical impossibility of satisfying all those claims.").
71
170 Wallace

1 See supra text accompanying note 35.

172See Mills & Mills, supra note 71, at 141-42.
173 Green, supra note 47.
'74 See generally id.
175 See supra note 71.
176Id.
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be accomplished even if Title I's private right of action is permanently repealed.
CONCLUSION

The reality is that Title III is a bad law. It does not provide an effective
means either to protect the property rights of U.S. citizens or to expedite the
collapse of Castro's regime. Moreover, Title III's implementation has set a
dangerous precedent and has hampered relations between the United States
and its trading partners. As a result, the United States' trading partners
have begun to engage in a "tit-for-tat" with the United States, which may
ultimately result in U.S. citizens incurring more retribution than compensation pursuant to Title I.
Accordingly, it would be in the best interest of the United States, as
well as the people of Cuba, for Congress and the President to permanently
repeal Title I's private right of action. Pursuant to this policy, the outstanding expropriation claims of the U.S. certified citizens should be resolved through the international claims settlement procedures already in
place, and the outstanding expropriation claims of Cuban-Americans who
were Cuban nationals at the time of confiscation should be resolved though
adjudication in Cuban courts. Such a policy would further the U.S. foreign
policy objectives outlined in Title IHL.

